As Regras Fiscais e a eficiência do governo: Uma Análise Empírica de 1996 a 2020
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55532/1806-8944.2024.231Palabras clave:
Regras Fiscais, Política Fiscal, Método de Momentos GeneralizadosResumen
O trabalho investiga os efeitos das principais categorias de regras fiscais (dívida, receita, despesa e resultados) nos agregados econômicos que cada uma busca controlar. Utilizando um conjunto de dados abrangendo 180 países no período de 1996 a 2020, foi analisada a interação entre as regras fiscais e a eficiência do governo. Para mensurar o impacto dessas regras, utilizamos o método de momentos generalizados (GMM). Os resultados indicam que o efeito da regra, por meio da regra da dívida, está associado ao controle da despesa e a um maior resultado fiscal. Além disso, enquanto as regras se mostram substitutas à eficiência do governo para o controle da dívida e maiores resultados fiscais, mostraram-se também complementares no caso da despesa.
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